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Logics and rationalisations underpinning entrepreneurial decision-making 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This article explores the logics that expert entrepreneurs use when faced with a 
critical incident threat.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: Attempts have been made to define “entrepreneurial logic”. 
This article is influenced by Sarasvathy’s work on high-performance entrepreneurs, which 
finds that when faced with uncertainty entrepreneurs employ unconventional logic, and 
encompasses later research acknowledging social contexts where entrepreneurs operate. A 
typology of decision-making logics is developed, taking into account the situation of crisis. 
Seven expert entrepreneurs who faced crisis and, despite this, are still successfully operating 
businesses were interviewed. The article develops a critical incidents methodology. 
 
Findings: Experienced entrepreneurs were found to tend towards causal logic when “the 
stakes were high” and the decision may affect the survival of their business. They also weigh 
up options before acting and tend to seek advice from trusted “others” within their network 
before or after they have made a decision. A mixture of causal and intuitive logic is evident in 
decisions dealing with internal business problems.  
 
Research limitations/implications: The decisions that entrepreneurs make shape and define 
their business and their ability to recover from crisis. If researchers can develop an 
understanding of how entrepreneurs make decisions – what information they draw upon, 
what support systems they use and the logic of their decision-making and rationalisation – 
then this can be used to help structure support.  
 
Originality/value: By exploring decision-making through critical incidents we offer an 
innovative way to understand context-rich, first-hand experiences and behaviours of 
entrepreneurs around a focal point. 
Key Words: Entrepreneur, Decision-making, Rationalisation, Logic, Rationality, 
Effectuation, Intuition. 
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Paper type: Research Paper. 
1. Introduction 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis had negative implications for many large and small firms. 
In large firms, decision-making is often diffused and shared while the decision-makers often 
need to take account of a wide array of conflicting interests. Are the small firms’ owners 
dealing with similar situations? The aim of this paper is to explore entrepreneurial decision-
making in a time of crisis – at a critical incident. In order to do this, theories are examined 
explaining entrepreneurial decision-making processes, and specifically those dealing with 
rational versus intuitive approaches and the “logic” of entrepreneurial decisions. In particular 
we focus on Sarasvathy’s (2001a) distinction between causation and effectuation. Her 
research shows that when faced with a myriad of uncertainties entrepreneurs tend to employ 
an effectuation logic to the extent that it is possible to influence future events, such that there 
is no need to predict them (Sarasvathy, 2007; Andersson, 2011). However, as Miller (2007) 
acknowledges, this is done in a dynamic social context. Through interviews with seven 
entrepreneurs operating in Leicester in the United Kingdom we develop a typology that 
allows us to explore how these entrepreneurs make decisions, the logic they use, and the 
support mechanisms they draw upon to reduce the risk of failure. In developing this typology 
of logic that entrepreneurs use this study builds upon Sarasvathy’s and Miller’s works, 
illustrating how the decision-making process emerges from the wider social context. The 
main contribution this paper makes is the insight into how entrepreneurs make decisions 
during critical events and what role their support network plays in solving problems. The next 
section of the paper defines the various decision-making approaches and discusses the theory 
underpinning this research.  
2. Rationality and intuition in decision-making 
The classical view of decision-making suggests that the decision-maker passes through a 
series of stages before a decision is reached. These stages include defining the problem, 
clarifying the objectives and alternatives, and then assessing the risks of different alternatives 
(Hammond et al., 1999). Essentially, this view explains decision-making as a rational 
process, where the actions of the decision-maker are structured in relation to the end goal 
(Mannheim, 1935). Underpinning this way of thinking is an assumption that individuals are 
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in control of their world and by collecting relevant information they are able to predict the 
outcomes of their decisions (Cunningham et al., 2002).  
Unfortunately, this does not sit comfortably with reality and has led to an exploration of the 
alternative of  rationality – irrationality – in decision-making. Underpinning this concept is an 
acknowledgement that many conscious and unconscious acts or thoughts are driven by 
impulses, wishes and/or feelings – the so-called intuition, which (Mannheim, 1935) defines 
as “substantial rationality or intuitive rationality”. These ideas have been taken up in the 
entrepreneurship field and are most noticeable in the works of Sarasvathy (2001a), who refers 
to this as “effectual” logic, or the entrepreneur’s “sixth sense,” which allows the entrepreneur 
to react to changes in the environment. In recent years a number of studies have explored 
how decisions are made by successful entrepreneurs or those operating in corporate settings 
(Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; McGrath et al., 1992; Baron, 1999; Sarasvathy, 2001b; 
Cunningham et al., 2002; Joyce and Woods, 2003; Baron, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2007; Dyer et 
al., 2008). The underlying purpose of these studies was to identify the “entrepreneurial logic” 
used to make decisions (Scott and Bruce, 1994; Nutt, 1999; Cunningham et al., 2002; 
Sarasvathy, 2007).  
Sarasvathy (2001a) argues that entrepreneurial action proceeds according to a logic of 
causation or effectuation. Both logics treat the opportunity as created, but effectuation makes 
goals endogenous and emergent rather than logically prior to creating an opportunity. This 
distinction between causation and effectuation provides further insight into the courses of 
action associated with opportunity creation or problem-solving. Causal logic involves 
selecting appropriate means to achieve chosen ends, while following a causal logic requires 
clarifying goals and an understanding of the relationship between means and ends. Effectual 
logic, however, starts with available means that are the basis for choosing feasible ends. 
Following effectual logic requires only general aspirations, and specific goals emerge in the 
entrepreneurial process. An entrepreneur’s preferences and goals are formed in an ongoing 
learning process, which is shaped by the effectuation processes. As such, understanding how 
entrepreneurs learn to think entrepreneurially requires an exploration of “how deep 
knowledge structures are changing … and … how entrepreneurial thinkers structure and learn 
to structure their knowledge, tacit or otherwise …” (Krueger, 2007). 
This represents a new way of thinking about entrepreneurial action. We can look to the 
stream of risk and uncertainty research from Knight (1921) onwards that has characterised 
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entrepreneurial rationality as investment decision-making when outcomes are probabilistic. 
Recognising that this is a unique, historically-situated perspective raises a prospect that there 
may be alternative ways of understanding entrepreneurship that call for other perspectives on 
risk and rationality. Risk arises from the inability to predict future environmental states 
(Miller, 2007). Under conditions of uncertainty, less reliable and verifiable information about 
the underlying distribution of outcomes is available than under conditions of risk (Knight, 
1921; Simon, 1973; deMattos et al., 2012). Evidence suggests that many decision-makers are 
systematically over-optimistic about their future prospects and that founders are especially 
prone to over-optimism (Cooper et al., 1988; Camerer and Lavallo, 1989; Alvarez and 
Parker, 2009). Knight’s discussion of uncertainty provides a striking anticipation of modern 
treatment of market failure (LeRoy and Singell, 1987. p. 396).  
Miller (2007, p. 59) argues that Knight (1921) suggests the rational response to uncertainty is 
seeking to reduce it to risk or, if that is not possible, to avoid investing altogether. As such, 
initiating a venture in the face of uncertainty is to act upon “intuition”, “whim” or “opinion”, 
rather than investing on the basis of expected profit. Rational decisions are possible only 
under risk, which permits computation of expected values and determination of whether the 
situation provides adequate compensation for the capital placed at risk. Hence, Knight’s 
theory of entrepreneurship depends on individuals having different abilities to convert 
situations of uncertainty towards situations of risk, not just on having differences in risk 
propensities (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Miller, 2007; Ndemo and Maina, 2007).  
Three recent papers contribute to this debate. Francioni et al. (2015, p. 2240) found that a 
more risk-seeking attitude brings the decision-maker to follow a more rational approach to 
the key strategic decisions. However, in cases where the decision-maker is not fearful of the 
risks pertaining to relevant strategic decisions they face them with a high awareness and pay 
attention to the choices they make. This result contrasts the idea that small entrepreneurs 
instinctively follow their intuition (Musso and Francioni, 2014). Moreover, Maine et al. 
(2015, p. 65) suggest that entrepreneurs may be able to enhance their resilience to external 
shocks and their ability to exploit contingencies through flexibility, thus employing 
effectuation-based decision-making; however, they seem to find that the entrepreneurs act 
rationally by, for instance, avoiding major investment decisions. Nevertheless, Maine et al. 
(2015, p. 67) note that in highly uncertain environments entrepreneurs become more causal in 
Page 4 of 29Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
 5
analysis and decision-making, and their firm’s strategy becomes more rigid, less 
experimental and less resilient.  
Nevertheless, Wu and Knott (2006) suggest that entrepreneurs are risk-averse regarding 
demand uncertainty but over-confident regarding their own ability, resulting in apparent risk-
seeking behaviour. Dyer et al. (2008, p. 318) explain that entrepreneurs are prone to cognitive 
biases, notably the over-confidence bias and representativeness bias (Parlich and Bagby, 
1995; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Zhao, 2009; Dinur, 2011). These biases act by motivating 
entrepreneurs to persist in pursuing new venture ideas, increasing the probability of venture 
creation. The over-confidence bias arises when individuals rank their own positive qualities 
or virtues as being higher than they really are. A quality which tends to be overestimated is 
the ability to forecast the future, and this over-confidence leads individuals to underestimate 
possible uncertainties in a decision environment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Sarasvathy, 
1999). Knight (1921, p. 220) expressed an appreciation for the distinction between 
“ignorance” and “real indeterminateness”, choosing the latter as his typology of probability 
situations.  
This paper aims to answer the following research question: What logics do decision-makers 
use when faced with a critical threat or a crisis? Solutions come from the basic cognitive 
processes that allow the entrepreneur to operate on and use information in new ways (Baron, 
2007, p. 169). From where do they get this information? Dyer et al. (2008) argue that 
entrepreneurs may have superior access to information because they have larger and more 
diverse social networks that provide a conduit for information. Renzulli et al. (2000) found 
that entrepreneurs with networks that spanned multiple domains of social life saw 
opportunities more frequently. Moreover, Baron (2007, p. 172) has claimed that 
entrepreneurs’ social skills (their ability to interact with others in an effective manner) and 
their social networks (networks of personal relationships with others) help them to acquire 
the resources they need to make decisions (Aldrich, 1999; Andressen, 2011). Such thinking is 
consistent with that of social network theorists who have argued that the structure of one’s 
social relationships determines the quantity of information, the quality of information, and 
how rapidly information can be acquired. In terms of entrepreneurial decision-making this is 
important and critical to discovering entrepreneurial opportunities (Marsden, 1983; Aldrich 
and Zimmer, 1986; Rodan and Galunic, 2004; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). This resonates with 
research, such as a comparative study of entrepreneurs and executives on opportunity search 
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where Kaish and Gilad (1991) found that entrepreneurs spent significantly more time 
searching for information through non-verbal scanning in their “off hours”. A related stream 
of research on cognition points to entrepreneurs being superior at pattern recognition – 
noticing connections between trends, changes and events which appear, at first glance, to be 
unrelated (Baron, 2006). Baron (2006, p. 171), building on prior psychological research (i.e. 
Sternberg and Davidson, 1995), notes that pattern recognition involves “noticing meaningful 
patterns in complex events or changes, includes: (1) recognizing links between trends, 
changes and events that appear at first glance to be unconnected; and (2) noticing that these 
connections [come] from an identifiable pattern”. Pattern recognition can therefore play an 
important role in entrepreneurial alertness and suggests that some individuals may be more or 
less “alert” to various opportunities because they possess cognitive frameworks that permit 
them to notice emerging opportunities even when they are not actively searching for them. 
Their frameworks serve as templates that assist such persons to recognise emergent patterns 
and opportunities related to them. 
This type of thinking suggests that the logic to entrepreneurial decision-making depends on a 
range of factors, in particular that individuals differ greatly in terms of the cognitive 
frameworks they possess. These frameworks, while useful in helping them to “connect the 
dots” between seemingly unrelated events or trends, are formed through interactions with 
others in social networks and their subjective beliefs, values and attitudes that develop over 
time and which may change over time on the basis of previous decisions and the acceptance 
of new information. As Miller (2007) argues, entrepreneurial decision-making is also 
influenced by the creative identity of the individual. Here creativity is understood as 
proceeding on the basis of problem-solving heuristics, which draw upon prior knowledge 
(e.g. through novel re-combinations) or as an expression of personal freedom (making 
creativity different from either deterministic or random acts). As such, creativity draws upon 
past learning but is not fully constrained by it. Identity also provides a critical logic, and 
entrepreneurial events arise not only from looking forward (i.e. anticipating future prospects) 
and looking backward (i.e. learning from experience) but also from looking inward (as an 
implication of one’s sense of self) (Miller, 2007, p. 66).  
If we acknowledge that entrepreneurs operate within a dynamic social system that 
incorporates them as individuals in relation to others who can influence and can be influenced 
by decisions made within the business, then we can develop a typology of the logic of 
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entrepreneurial decision-making and rationalisation of such decisions. This typology 
considers from where entrepreneurial decisions are derived – the source of the information 
used to make decisions – which in part depends on the nature of the decision to be made. 
While Sarasvathy’s work on high-performance entrepreneurs’ cognitive biases shows that, 
when faced with a myriad of uncertainties, entrepreneurs tend to employ unconventional 
logic to the extent that it is possible to influence future events such that there is no need to 
predict them (Sarasvathy, 2001a, 2007). As a result, they construct new frameworks to 
understand the environment (Weick, 1995). Miller’s (2007, p. 70) point is taken that this 
overplays the role of the individual and the argument that entrepreneurs need to be examined 
within their social context. Entrepreneurs utilise a network of support mechanisms in 
decision-making, which they draw upon to reduce the risk of failure. To this effect, it is 
suggested that not only do entrepreneurs tend to look backward, forward and inward when 
making decisions, but that th y also look outward and engage with, and are influenced by, 
others in their decision-making. This is represented in the “networked” dimension of the 
typology developed here to go beyond the individualistic orientation of entrepreneurs in their 
decision-making. Looking inward and outward, as well as looking forward and backward, 
therefore serves as the basis of the typology of logic in entrepreneurial decision-making 
shown in Figure 1.  
______________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
______________________ 
The next section of the paper uses the typology as the basis for examining the logic of 
entrepreneurial decision-making, and particularly decision-making at a time of crisis.  
3. Research method 
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with seven expert entrepreneurs who were 
operating successful businesses in the manufacturing through to marketing sectors. A 
purposive sampling technique was employed as expert entrepreneurs who have experienced 
and overcome a crisis are rare. The Business Link in Leicester was approached and 
subsequently provided the contact details of 20 expert entrepreneurs who fitted the criteria of 
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managing a crisis within their own business and acting as mentors to local enterprises dealing 
with a crisis. Of these, seven agreed to participate in the study, corresponding to 35% of 
available respondents. Adopting Glaser and Strauss (1967), theoretical saturation was 
achieved with just seven case studies, as the last few cases gave very similar responses as to 
how the expert entrepreneurs were dealing with specific critical events within their business. 
Appendix 1 provides the demographics of the participants and their firms. The interviews 
were conducted in the summer of 2008, just at the start of the Global Financial Crisis. The 
purpose of the interview with the business founder/owner was to elicit information about 
their business and the role they played within the business on a day-to-day basis, as well as 
the basis for their business. Interviewees were questioned about how they thought they made 
decisions and where they drew information from to help them make decisions, as well as how 
as mentors they were advising other businesses to prepare for and deal with the consequences 
of crises. Through this process of questioning the focus turned to a critical incident they 
experienced in the life of their business and the businesses they were advising.  
The use of the critical incident technique (CIT) methodology helped to understand how 
entrepreneurs make decisions at the time of crisis. Flanagan (1953, p. 335) argues that the 
“critical incident technique is essentially a procedure for gathering certain important facts 
concerning behaviour in defined situations”. To that effect the interviewee was asked to 
describe the incident, why they saw it as being a critical incident and then the process by 
which they resolved the problem at the heart of the incident. More recently, work has been 
undertaken by Chell and Pittaway (1998), who build on McClelland (1987) in using a 
technique termed the “Behavioural Event Interview” to identify behaviours associated with 
business development and entrepreneurship. As Chell and Pittaway (1998, p. 24) illustrate, 
“… studies in the tradition of Flanagan have assumed the tenets of the scientific method and 
used the CIT as a quantitative method …” Their study proposed six elements of the research 
process relevant to CIT, which are adopted within this study: 
(i)  gaining access 
(ii)  focusing the theme and giving an account of oneself as researcher to the 
respondent 
(iii)  introducing the CIT method 
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(iv)  controlling the interview, by probing the incidents and clarifying one’s 
understanding 
 (v)  concluding the interview 
(vi)  taking care of ethical issues. 
The process that researchers need to follow when utilising CIT is very specific, and requires 
undertaking initial research on the subject to bind the investigation, identifying selection 
criteria for the sample and interviews schedules, and undertaking the actual interviews in an 
unstructured or semi-structured way. Moreover, Chell and Pittaway (1998) suggest that the 
interviewer needs to have a sound understanding of the theoretical issues involved, to 
understand the areas that need further probing and to be able to adapt the questioning to a 
particular interviewee. The use of CIT was particularly relevant within this study, as this 
method enables the study of a phenomenon that cannot be studied outside its natural setting.  
The interviews were undertaken in a semi-structured fashion; however, the starting points 
were around the founder, their business experience and motivations to set up this business, 
and then moved on to identify the fundamental events that have changed the business 
direction or particular outcomes. The conversations unfolded in a variety of ways and led to 
evidence of intuitive and rational responses to specific problems the respondents have faced. 
To control the flow and the content of the interview Chell’s (2014) recommendations were 
followed to actively engage in steering the expert entrepreneurs to discuss in greater depth the 
critical incidents that they identified. To prevent the interview from descending into 
unfocused accounts, generic probing questions were used following Chell (2014, p. 120): 
What happened next? Why did it happen? How did it happen? With whom? What did the 
parties concerned feel? What were the consequences – immediate and long term? How did 
you cope? What tactics did you use? Why was it appropriate at the time? What did you learn 
from this incident? What would you have done differently? How does this affect going 
forward? The use of CIT in understanding the way expert entrepreneurs make decisions and 
rationalisations of those decisions within this paper enabled the researchers to identify and 
analyse patterns of thinking that underpinned actions as a result of important events that 
participants discussed. This methodological approach provided what Leitch (2015, p. 194) 
identifies as “context-rich first hand perspectives on human activities and their significance”.  
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In conducting the interview analysis a constant comparative method, as described by 
Browning et al. (1995, p. 121), was used to extract categories and themes from the interview 
data. To aid the qualitative data analysis process the transcripts were entered into NVivo and 
this software was used to help reveal patterns and themes associated with the entrepreneurial 
decision-making process, as well as the sources of information and support they drew upon. 
The transcripts were initially coded by one researcher to attribute the decision-making into 
effectual or rational. Through cross–case comparison evidence of the overlap between 
rational and effectual dimensions were also established in the data. This process of constant 
comparison enabled the researchers to signpost the decision-making patterns and associate 
the evidence with the entrepreneurial logics from the proposed typology, as this was carried 
out by two researchers testing for inter-coder reliability. To illustrate the three positions on 
the developed typology, three vignette cases are included, one each for Experiential, 
Networked Anticipatory and Network Experiential. These have been chosen on the basis of 
the fit with the typology and the level of expertise the respondents had, based on the age of 
their founded firms, whether they have experienced a particular critical incident internally or 
externally. and if that had an effect on their business and entrepreneurial developments.  
This study is subject to the general limitations of generalisability associated with field 
research, which are well documented (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the organisation and 
structuring of the data around common themes enables the building of multiple case studies 
where similarities and differences can be explored. Multiple respondents provide a stronger 
base for theory-building (Yin, 1994) and the findings are generalisable to theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
4. Key findings and case study illustrations 
The decision-making process and the logic underpinning those decisions were explored by 
controlling the interviews around a particular critical incident pertinent to the survival of the 
entrepreneurial venture. Where entrepreneurs draw information from to help them make 
decisions was also explored. Table 1 shows the examples of critical incidents identified by 
entrepreneurs as those that challenged their thinking, and made them make decisions within 
their organisation. It can be seen that some of the more critical problems were those that are 
generically faced by any business, for example: a fire in the factory, which had an 
unprecedented effect on the firm’s ability to deliver on schedule; the loss of key customers, 
which created a lack of financial resources within the business and put the business in a 
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severe financial situation; and problems with market entry for a newly developed business, as 
the industry it sought to enter had high barriers to entry that were not apparent based on the 
research undertaken.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 assigns specific types of entrepreneurial logic used to support each entrepreneur’s 
decision-making. The interviewees were asked about how they thought they made decisions 
following the critical incident schema. A set of more detailed excerpts in Table 2 and Table 3 
represents the summary of the thematic analysis. A number of key statements made by the 
expert entrepreneurs were identified in relation to how they thought they dealt with a critical 
incident, enabling the process of their decision-making as they dealt with the critical incident 
to be mapped out in relation to key justifications, embedded in rational and intuitive 
principles.  
_______________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_______________________ 
 
The quotes in Tables 2 and 3 are illustrative of the effectual (intuitive) and more rational 
approaches to solving problems in relation to critical incidents.  
 
Table 4 maps out further excerpts from respondents, indicating the overlap between rational 
judgements and more intuitive effectual principals that formed the basis for their decision-
making. This second-level coding, using the constant comparative method, provided support 
for classifying the critical incidents and the associated entrepreneurial logic utilised in 
decision-making.  
Page 11 of 29 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
 12
 
__________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
__________________ 
It is clear that there is a degree of effectuation as well as causation in the logic underpinning 
respondents’ decision-making. However, it is also apparent that effectual and causal thinking 
are not mutually exclusive, and both logics inform decision-making at different points in 
time. Moreover, it was apparent from the interviews that decisions were not made by simply 
looking inwards. In each of the cases the entrepreneur consulted another person either 
associated with their business or family, for example “I talk to my wife, she works and she 
has HR issues as well, so we often swap of [sic] stories” (CH, Vignette 2), or who had 
particular expertise to help them make the “right” decision.  
Three vignettes have been selected to illustrate the decision-making around critical incidents 
in more detail. These provide evidence underpinning the types of logic outlined in the 
typology of entrepreneurial logic. 
Vignette 1: BE’s response to a fire in the factory – Experiential Logic 
In the case of BE the critical incident was a fire that destroyed the entire factory and all its 
output. This was devastating, and signalled a complete end to the business. However, BE 
refused to accept the loss adjustor’s decision on the insurance payout for the business. It was 
through his own dogged determination, and after others in the business had given up, that he 
sat down and combed through the insurance documents trying to find a solution. As he 
explains:  
… we had a massive fire which melted the whole production operation and we 
thought the world had ended. It was terrible. I sat up thinking what's the way out of 
this? … Some chaps even left the company, I think they thought we couldn’t recover 
… we were offered by our insurance company damages to rebuild the equipment, 
damages were about £150 000. But of course we lost trade in that period. So what I 
did was search through our insurance policy and I found a small clause in it that 
meant we could call in a loss adjuster and through the loss adjuster we got 3.2 
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million. That was the difference. As a result we were offered by our insurance 
company damages to rebuild the equipment, the building – all the damage … I just 
happened to spot the solution by searching and searching.  
However, while BE drew upon his experience to find a solution, he then needed to have that 
solution confirmed by his Board. As he explained:  
I came to a conclusion, my conclusion as to what the answer was. I then asked my 
Board before taking any actions. I said to the executive Board, “This is what I came 
up with, what do you think? Throw rocks at this” … We all then came to the same 
conclusion to call in the loss adjuster. The board agreed. If you try to fly solo – it 
doesn't work … 
Vignette 2: CH’s response to a key customer going bankrupt – Networked Experiential Logic 
In the case of CH the critical incident was a financial damage caused by a key customer 
going bankrupt. This was an unexpected event and it had severe consequences on the 
business’s cash flow. As CH explains: 
… It took us by surprise. It was a company that grew like hell and we suspected it was 
out of control, but while it was growing we didn’t worry. We were making a lot of 
money out of it, so when it went bust … they had a debt of £50 000. As a result we had 
[a] 25% drop in sales, so I went into red and so … I was wondering whether this drop 
in sales would leave us so low in terms of margin, that we would not be profitable. So 
it was a turmoil! I had to act fairly decisively … it was probably intuition … I knew I 
had to lay off people in the warehouse … 
Although CH came up with a solution alone and the time was pressing for it to be 
implemented, he consulted his directors, who were not keen on engaging with this type of 
decision. As CH explains: 
What I did is bounce some of my ideas off the management team to see whether I had 
forgotten something or if there was something I still had to do. I gave them an 
opportunity to contribute to the decision and perhaps fine tune it … Did they really 
contribute? I think they were shell shocked and did not really want to partake in the 
exercise … But I had to let them know what we were doing. And, once again, I was 
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just checking with them. I needed to know if I was wrong or forgetting something, 
these were the steps I took. 
CH also talked about the wider impact and the consequences of these types of decisions and 
the rationale for choosing the person to be fired: 
But we operate in a small town, so it is not just the business you think about, it will 
have a big impact on the person also … so there are consequences. In a small town 
you need to be careful about laying people off. And the person I had to lose … I did 
talk to the other managers in the end, and eventually we made it together. We isolated 
the person who was not very flexible; we were moving to using IT with our clients and 
this person was struggling to cope with all that. Bloody good at the rest of the job, 
fantastic organiser, but eventually I had to let them go. That person eventually ended 
up working for one of our clients … 
Vignette 3: LA’s considerations about re-branding of the business – Networked Anticipatory 
Logic 
In the case of LA the critical incident was to do with a decision to re-brand the business and 
ensure that it more eloquently represented the business they were in. As LA explains: 
… the most critical issue was re-branding. This caused a number of conflicts and 
made us have discussions every day about which logo we should use and did it really 
depict the brand we wanted it to, and so on. The logo was crucial for many reasons 
with the company being split between printing and designing, and we were trying to 
incorporate the design into becoming more important as that was where the value-
added was going to. That logo needed to be an example of what the design studio was 
capable of, but also, I think, in terms of colour it needed to evoke trust and give a 
sense of creativity and convey the innovative nature of the company as well … 
It was not a decision that was made by LA alone. The initial decision was conceived between 
the partners and the consultant; however, in order to ensure there were positive consequences 
to their decision a number of other parties were consulted. LA explains: 
The initial decision as to whether to re-brand was really between me, Steve and our 
consultant. And to some extent Marcus who was the production manager. But when 
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the decision has been made to re-brand, then the choice of logos and the rest of the 
marketing material, but particularly the logo, we had to get the other staff involved, 
on the shop floor, we wanted them to give us their opinion, because we needed to 
bring them along with the re-branding and make them feel part of it, and it[’s] always 
good to get other people’s perceptions. It took a long time to get there, but we got 
there in the end … 
She went on to explain in more detail the reasons for seeking information from within her 
network to help them resolve the problem: 
… ultimately we talked to the people who were going to be buying from us, but also 
because when you are looking at changing the market you need to know what your 
current customers are thinking because you need to take them along to support you in 
the first stages. But it wasn’t just people, we also looked at our competitors, because 
we were looking to distinguish ourselves. Doing this also helped me to be confident 
that I was making the right decision … I suppose there were alternatives: we could 
have done nothing, left things as they were. But the long-term strategy and I think 
with the way the market was moving meant this really wasn’t an option. In the end we 
knew it was the right thing to do, I knew it instinctively, really … 
These three cases depict three of the four types of entrepreneurial decision-making logic. 
However, they also show that decision-making is not a solitary activity for entrepreneurs, and 
while intuition forms an important part in the formulation of their initial solution, rational 
logic becomes imperative when the stakes are high. Looking outwards and seeking 
information from others help to minimise risk and enable the experiences of others to be used 
fruitfully in solving problems. In effect, these show that effectual thinking is moderated by 
rational logic. 
5. Discussion  
The purpose of the study was to examine the emerging approaches entrepreneurs take to 
decision-making in the context of a critical incident. To achieve this, research on decision-
making was examined, particularly that of Sarasvathy (2001a), where she distinguishes 
between causation and effectuation and argues that effectual logic defines entrepreneurial 
decision-making. In other words, she argues that amongst expert entrepreneurs it is an 
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intuitive logic that predominates in decision-making. However, recently there have been 
criticisms of this approach by Arend et al. (2015) and Miller (2007), in particular arguing that 
entrepreneurs cannot be isolated when exploring decision-making, as the social context in 
which they operate must be taken into account. A typology is developed here, categorising 
the logic of entrepreneurial decision-making based on effectual or causal logic as well as 
from where entrepreneurs draw information – internally or externally. The types are: 
1. Anticipatory Logic, where the entrepreneur anticipates future prospects based on what 
they know; in other words they think causally and look inwards. 
2. Experiential Logic, where the entrepreneur looks inwards and draws the solutions to 
their problem from their own experience and is therefore thinking effectually. 
3. Networked Anticipatory Logic, where the entrepreneur anticipates the future and 
checks with those from within their wider social network and thus draws knowledge 
by looking outward. 
4. Networked Experiential Logic, where the entrepreneur draws on their own experience 
as well as that within their wider social network to find a solution to their problem. 
This typology allows the different approaches to decision-making used by entrepreneurs 
when they respond to a critical incident to be evaluated. It suggests that when entrepreneurs 
make a decision by themselves, whether relying on rational reasoning or intuition, this 
decision is likely to be less informed than if they consult others more widely from their social 
network. There is greater risk involved in not consulting others – not that others are able to 
provide a definite solution. It may mean that others operate in more of a social comfort role in 
this critical decision-making process. This does not change the level of uncertainty that 
Knight (1921) identified, but instead helps the entrepreneurs to manage uncertainty down to 
risk.  
The interviews with seven expert entrepreneurs who operated a range of businesses differing 
in size and age revealed that many of them think that their decision-making is based on 
intuition or effectual logic. It became apparent from the interviews that intuition played a key 
role in the decision-making process, and came from either an innate ability and a more 
subconscious reaction to a crisis situation, or general experience that had been accumulated in 
response to problems solved by these entrepreneurs in the past. Past decisions act as learning 
experiences and inform contemporary decisions and, as such, a heuristic is developed and 
used. Intuition provides the initial stimulus for a decision, and all seven interviewees 
Page 16 of 29Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
 17
mentioned intuition as a part of their decision-making process. However, what transpired was 
that a decision-maker who was aware of intuitive influences at the decision formulation stage 
was likely to moderate their instinct with a consideration of rational information and 
alternative solutions. Indeed, when exploring decision-making in response to a critical 
incident no examples were found of the problem being dealt with using intuition or 
effectuation alone. 
The results indicate that the logic underpinning entrepreneurial decision-making depends on 
the nature and seriousness of the problem, and the entrepreneur’s experience and their 
consideration of the future consequences, which result from either looking inward or looking 
outward. Similar to the findings of Francioni et al. (2015), it was found here that 
entrepreneurs tended towards causal logic when “the stakes were high” and the decision 
could have an effect on their firm’s survival. However, the contribution of this research to the 
debate is that in such situations they all sought advice from trusted “others” within their 
social network, and either weighed up alternatives before acting or sought consent for their 
decision. Moreover, another unusual response observed within the sample was the decision to 
rationalise the decision that was already made with the trusted network, as if to “rubber-
stamp” it. This may represent a political dimension that Maine et al. (2015) explored but 
found little support for within their study. A mixture of causal and effectual logic was 
therefore evident in many decisions when entrepreneurs were looking outward to their 
network. These results echo some of the findings from Francioni et al. (2015), who identified 
that decision-makers tend to follow a more rational logic depending on their education level, 
risk attitude, and the firm’s past performance.  
Hence, the main contribution this research makes is that logics that underpin decision-making 
of entrepreneurs have not previously been explored in the context of responding to a threat or 
critical incident. Schumpeter stated, in Neubauer and Lank (1998, p.176), that “the success of 
everything depends on intuition, the capacities of seeing things in a way which afterwards 
proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the moment …”. However, it is a 
high-risk strategy to rely entirely on intuition. For appropriate instinctive decisions and 
actions to crisis situations, and to situations that require an instant response, extensive 
practice is required to indicate that the entrepreneur is ready to take the plunge, whereas for 
decisions where there is more time available there should be procedures in place which will 
allow for the “right” decision to emerge. It is problematic to suggest there is a mutually 
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exclusive choice between causal and effectual logic when it comes to decision-making. 
Entrepreneurs need to be able to analyse a problem systematically (using causal logic) and to 
respond to situations rapidly (driven by effectuation). Successful entrepreneurs do not choose 
between logics; instead, they use these as part of an arsenal of skills and apply each when it is 
appropriate. 
6. Conclusion  
The decisions entrepreneurs make can shape and define their business, as well as their own 
destiny. An understanding of how entrepreneurs make decisions – what information they 
draw upon, what support systems they use and the logic of their decision-making and 
rationalisation – can help to structure the support they need. The research carried out by the 
major authors in the field informed by Sarasvathy (2001a,b), and lately by Maine et al. 
(2015) and Francioni et al. (2015), tends to rely on the individualistic approaches to decision-
making, and examines the expert entrepreneurs as if they are isolated, rather than embedded 
within the social context. Might this be due to the more individualistic behaviour amongst the 
respondents within their studies? Such biases could be explored in future research.  
The present findings, somewhat contrary to recent work on entrepreneurial decision-making, 
suggest that when it comes to an important decision that can have major consequences, 
entrepreneurs rely on their intuition to generate a solution to the problem and then tend to 
consult their wider network; by doing so they share the responsibility for decisions, seek 
confirmation for their ideas or utilise these connections as social comfort. In support terms 
this may mean facilitating access to other experts. Knight (1921) has contributed to a 
thorough analysis of motivations and characteristics needed to become a successful 
entrepreneur: “a successful uncertainty bearer and judgemental decision maker” (Van Praag, 
1999, p. 322). The typology presented here attempts to capture this, seeking to explain the 
types of logic used by entrepreneurs when making decisions.  
While the typology needs to be tested using a larger sample we did not find entrepreneurs 
who used effectual logic alone. We have clear evidence of the decision-making and 
rationalisation logic embedded within the social context of trusted or expert networks that 
seems to be more useful in times of a critical event. This raises a question about the role of 
effectuation and how it is used in the entrepreneur’s arsenal of skills. Decisions have 
consequences beyond the individual alone, which experienced entrepreneurs are aware of. By 
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looking outwards, entrepreneurs may be able to minimise risks as well as to overcome the 
biases they hold and bring to decisions. This research points to an increasingly important 
integration of social context when decisions are critical to survival. Moreover, critical 
incidents might be significantly important for the life of the business, and how entrepreneurs 
are learning from them and interacting with their networks can help society to make 
sustainable decisions that can be successful in the long run. 
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Table 1: Examples of critical incidents discussed 
 BE SB MR AA CH LA LP 
Critical incident Fire in the factory Firing a friend Firing an 
employee 
Working with a 
partner 
Loss of key 
customer 
Lack of brand 
recognition 
Market entry problem 
Type of problem Loss of the 
building and 
contents 
Loss of trust 
 
Inability of an 
employee to do 
the job 
Lack of input 
from partner 
Negative financial 
situation 
Ineffective marketing High barriers to 
market entry 
Type of solution Careful 
examination of 
insurance 
documents 
Putting aside 
personal 
relationship 
Recourse to legal 
counsel 
Buy out 
partner’s share 
Cut costs by 
reducing staffing 
numbers 
Engaging in marketing 
and re-branding 
Searching for market 
openings through a 
different network 
Who was consulted Board of directors Wife Legal helpline Family Accountant, 
directors within 
the business 
Consultants Business mentors, 
friends, family 
What did they 
contribute? 
Supported the 
decision 
Intuitive 
understanding of 
personalities 
Legal advice General support General support 
and factual data 
Advice on how to 
market their services 
and to whom, and logo 
design 
Contacts 
Was the decision 
rational or 
intuitive? 
Rational Intuitive Mixture of both Mixture of both Mixture of both Rational Rational 
Typology of 
Entrepreneurial 
Logic 
Experiential 
Logic 
 
Networked 
Anticipatory  
Logic 
 
Networked 
Experiential  
Logic 
 
Networked 
Anticipatory  
Logic 
 
Networked 
Experiential  
Logic 
 
Networked 
Experiential  Logic 
 
Networked 
Anticipatory  Logic 
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Table 2: Effectual (intuitive) logic – first-level coding illustrations 
Supporting evidence (data analysis) Effectuation principles 
BE: “it is like having a set of cards in front of you and you play it 
accordingly” 
SB: “often I would take decisions which are uninformed decisions based 
around my gut feel” 
SB: “I make decisions based on experience. I probably sort of try to leap 
forward and anticipate what would happen if – and maybe that is one of the 
driving forces in terms of the more experience you got the more easy it is to 
anticipate ...” 
Affordable Loss 
 
BE: “most entrepreneurs don't think in straight lines” 
CH: “sometimes I work on impulse. I[’ve] got really strong values and 
that’s how I remember business. And if values get affected then I tend to act 
very quickly, instinctively” 
Acceptable Risk 
Heuristic 
 
BE: “if my antenna says don't do something, I stop” 
BE: “I prefer strongly not to go with the expected beliefs. I like to go 
against the herd” 
AA: “I think that all entrepreneurs trust their instinct. They make a decision 
and you convince yourself and you convince every single person that it is 
the right decision and it is the only decision ...” 
Logic of Control 
 
BE: “most times I've been right; sometimes I have been quite wrong”  
BE: “it is a sense of understanding the temperature of the business” 
MR: “it felt more right than the other options available along the spectrum”  
MR: “I use intuition in my decision-making… I think I do get a feel, a sense 
of what is right” 
Evaluation 
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Table 3: Causal (rational) logic
 
– first-level coding illustrations 
Supporting evidence (data analysis) Rational principles 
AA: “you’ve got to look at cost implications; you’ve got to look at 
if it is possible” 
Cost 
BE: “but there is a balancing point in these kinds of decisions, 
which are right for the business in that they are most likely to 
achieve the outcome – and that outcome is [a] stronger 
organisation, more income, more robust, better able to withstand 
the competition, steeper in its cover in the event of any failures and 
more likely to deliver the necessary outcome” 
BE: “I’m balancing the value that the different decisions on the 
spectrum will deliver” 
Balancing Act 
MR: “I will always measure the situation. I won’t go on gut feel 
alone because I would feel personally uncomfortable with that” 
Measuring the Situation 
MR: “I had had some input internally which I was happy to take at 
face value but actually I wanted to verify it for myself. But I didn’t 
want to go back to the people who give me the advice internally 
and say ‘I’m not sure I believe this’, I wanted to do it for myself. 
So I did that bit separately and privately as it were in a sense of not 
involving them in my verification of the facts of the matter” 
Verification Process 
MR: “it is very rare that I come up with a decision because the 
moment happens to suggest it” 
LA: “if time is short, then I would make a judgement and go with 
it” 
Expert Judgement 
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Table 4: Evidence of overlap of Causal and Effectual logics  
 Affordable Loss Acceptable Risk Heuristic Logic of Control Evaluation 
Cost MR: “I try to find numerical 
justification for a lot of the 
decisions that we would make” 
AA: “numbers don’t lie, I mean, 
numbers are key in a lot of things, but 
at the same time I use intuition just as 
much as anything else” 
  
Balancing 
Act 
MR: “I look for patterns in the 
business; I’ll try to understand 
whether the history of business or 
any other business informs the 
decision” 
 MR: “I will always get a sense of 
what is right or wrong. But 
depending on the situation I will 
use that intuition to inform the 
decision to a greater or lesser 
degree” 
 
Measuring 
the Situation 
SB: “there are many occasions 
when I should have had more 
information but I didn’t have the 
brains to realise it” 
 
CH: “I say this may or may not be the 
right way and you may or may not 
agree with this, but this is what we are 
going to do and I take responsibility 
for the outcome”  
 LA: “I suppose a lot of what I do is 
down to experience and gut feel” 
Verification 
Process 
BE: “I think we all try to be 
rational – I think we are rational – 
but if I think the data is wrong or 
there is something wrong 
somewhere then I become 
intuitive and don't act 
accordingly” 
 
MR: “I talk to the board of the 
directors and the shareholders, then I 
talk to my wife because she has a view 
of our future, therefore the impact on 
the business and the risks and benefits 
of making decisions at that level” 
MR: “if there is lots of 
disagreement, everybody’s got a 
different view but I know that I’m 
right or think that I know that I’m 
right, then sometimes I just have to 
exercise my own authority”  
CH: “for the big decisions I will take the 
data I have got but – you know other 
people carry on getting more and more 
data but once I got enough data I wait 
for the – I suppose what I’m doing is I 
brew it over in my mind until I get a 
eureka moment” 
Expert 
Judgement 
 LA: “I need to know that it is a right 
thing. And whether it is initially a gut 
feel and I know it is right or whether I 
am not sure and I have then to do a bit 
of research and then gut feel for it” 
CH: “I would always support my 
instinct with some sort of data, 
some rationale” 
 
LA: “you have to pick out what is 
important and what is not when you are 
given a lot of information in whatever 
form; you have got to pick out the key” 
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Appendix 1: Participants 
Code Gender Birthplace Age Business Ownership Established Employees  
BE M UK 55-
64 
Freezing 
equipment 
Founder-
owner 
1980 120 
SB M UK 45-
54 
Lawn-
mowing sales 
Founder-
owner 
1992 20 
MR M UK 45-
54 
Cheque 
printing 
Partner 1997 100 
AA M UK 25-
34 
Hotel and 
restaurant 
Founder-
owner 
2003 10 
CH M UK 55-
64 
Direct 
marketing 
services 
Founder-
owner 
1996 60 
LA F UK 25-
34 
Printing 
services 
Partner 2001 5 
LP M UK 25-
34 
Vending 
machines 
Founder-
owner 
2006 2 
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Figure 1: Typology of logic in entrepreneurial decision-making 
 Looking forward 
 
Anticipating future 
prospects  
Looking backward 
 
Learning from 
experience 
 
Looking inward 
 
An implication of 
one’s sense of self 
 
Anticipatory Logic 
 
Causal 
 
 
Experiential Logic 
 
Effectual 
 
 
Looking outward 
 
An implication of 
one’s outside 
network of trusted 
people 
 
Networked 
Anticipatory Logic 
 
Networked Causal 
 
Networked 
Experiential Logic 
 
Networked Effectual 
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